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ECOSYSTEM OF DISTRUST
Mark Verstraete & Derek E. Bambauer*
ABSTRACT
The Internet has famously democratized the information
ecosystem. Online, everyone is a pundit: each participant can
share news, analyze events, and opine. The analog system, by
contrast, was one where incumbent intermediaries (frequently
licensed by governments) performed a powerful, centralized
gatekeeping function that largely regulated the creation and
dissemination of news. Scholars have mostly welcomed the rise
of the democratized, networked Fourth Estate. We argue that
this transformation is not at all an unalloyed good. Moreover, in
celebrating this technological revolution, commentators have
neglected the role of cultural factors that tend to magnify the
pernicious effects of a flattened information hierarchy.
Distrust in social institutions has been on the rise since
the Watergate crisis in the 1970s. While government has been
the most obvious target of falling confidence, media entities and
subject matter experts have also been increasingly the focus of
skepticism. The advent of the Internet has magnified this effect:
gatekeepers such as CBS and the New York Times are vilified
when wrong and invisible when correct. Many eyes make media
errors shallow. Moreover, traditional journalistic norms that
require forthright admission of mistakes help reinforce narratives
that portray the “mainstream media” as biased, incompetent,
and out of touch.
The current phenomenon labeled as “fake news,” and the
older trend of conspiracy theories, are outgrowths of both the
technological amplification of skeptical or nihilistic voices and
the postmodern assault on information shibboleths. It is critical
to realize that the Internet’s initial promise of disintermediation
was illusory: gatekeepers have not been eliminated, but merely
replaced. The new breed of intermediaries operates with
radically different financial incentives and professional norms
than their predecessors did. While Facebook moderates and
removes information on its ubiquitous platform for violations of
amorphous community standards, the company’s goal is not the
production of truth, but rather the generation of increased traffic
*
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and interaction by users. Falsity can be profitable if it’s popular.
Both the old and new bosses curated content, but to vastly
different ends.
We argue that the new architecture of networked
information has a structurally corrosive effect. It is easier to
generate doubt about narratives—even those produced by
previously trusted sources—than it is to create trusted content.
Previously, intermediaries served as choke points: they reacted
to incentives that led them to filter unreliable material, in order
to preserve their status as creators of the historical record. Now,
authors and distributors attract attention (which they monetize)
by casting doubt. The most pernicious feature of the Internet
news ecosystem is that it leads to a cascade of cynicism: it
reinforces not just skepticism about a particular course, but
distrust for all media production.
Importantly, current scholarly accounts of fake news and
conspiracy theories are technologically overdetermined. The
democratization of information flows by networked computing
cannot fully account for the spread of fake news and the distrust
of established media more generally. We argue that cultural
factors are neglected causes of these phenomena. First, the
technological transformation of the public sphere is
accompanied by a social shift toward pervasive distrust of
experts. This anti-intellectual turn both constitutes and is
constituted by the spread of fake news. Second, while fake news
has taken a stronger hold in America than in Europe, the
technical systems that undergird the information economy are
nearly identical on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus, we explore
the non-technical factors that make the United States particularly
amenable to the spread of fake news and a culture of media
distrust.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ....................................................................... 131
I. The Case for Cultural Analysis ........................................ 132
A. Fake News Across the Globe ...................................... 133
B. Media Polarization Across the U.S. Political Spectrum 136
C. The Internet and the Decline of Traditional Media ...... 137
II. Fake News and Our Unpredictable Future...................... 138
A. Postmodernism and Pyrrhic Victories ......................... 145
III. A Cautionary Note on Interventions ............................. 147
A. Platform Problems ..................................................... 148
B. First Amendment Fears .............................................. 149

2018]

ECOSYSTEM OF DISTRUST

131

INTRODUCTION
Online, no one knows that you’re a dog, but many people
may well think you’re a journalist.1
The dominant explanation for the rise of fake news
places Internet technology—especially social media such as
Facebook and Twitter—at the center of the narrative.2 It is
certainly correct that technology is not neutral. Science and
Technology Studies (STS) demonstrate that different technical
systems favor certain political and cultural arrangements.3 The
technical underpinnings of fake news are no exception to this
rule. Technical changes in news distribution are a piece of the
origin story for the rapid proliferation of fake news in the media
ecosystem. However, the recent turn toward news aggregation
and dissemination on Internet platforms like Facebook and
Twitter only provides part of that story. Technology and society
are co-constitutive. While technology shapes society, our
political and cultural systems also shape how technology
develops and the social impacts of emerging technology.4
Technology and society inhabit a feedback loop through which
they act on (and influence) each other.5
For the most part, legal scholars have concentrated on the
role that technical changes in the news ecosystem play in the
production and spread of fake news. Writing for this Symposium
issue, for example, Richard Hasen details how Internet platforms
have lowered the cost of speech, leading to the rise of fake news.6
Facebook and Twitter have largely displaced conventional news
1

Peter Steiner’s famous cartoon appeared in The New Yorker on July 5, 1993. See
Michael Cavna, Nobody Knows You’re a Dog: As Iconic Internet Cartoon Turns 20, Creator
Peter Steiner Knows the Joke Rings as Relevant as Ever, WASH. POST (July 31, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/comic-riffs/post/nobody-knows-youre-adog-as-iconic-internet-cartoon-turns-20-creator-peter-steiner-knows-the-joke-rings-asrelevant-as-ever/2013/07/31/73372600-f98d-11e2-8e84-c56731a202fb_blog.html.
2
See, e.g., Brian Resnick, The Science Behind Why Fake News is so Hard to Wipe Out,
VOX (Oct. 31, 2017, 5:36 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-andhealth/2017/10/5/16410912/illusory-truth-fake-news-las-vegas-google-facebook; see
also David Pierson, Facebook and Google Pledged to Stop Fake News. So Why Did They
Promote Las Vegas-Shooting Hoaxes?, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017, 4:55 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-vegas-fake-news-20171002-story.html.
3
See Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980).
4
See generally EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET
FREEDOM (2011) (offering a critique of techno-utopianism).
5
See generally DONALD A. MACKENZIE & JUDY WACJMAN, THE SOCIAL SHAPING
OF TECHNOLOGY (1999). As David Golumbia writes, “certain technologies tend to
come with implicit politics, these have often been formed by the developers of the
technology, and are almost always subject to the social matrices in which those
technologies are embedded, and the technologies themselves are largely shaped by
these social matrices.” ROBERTO SIMANOWSKI, DIGITAL HUMANITIES AND DIGITAL
MEDIA: CONVERSATIONS ON CULTURE, AESTHETICS, AND LITERACY 132 (2016).
6
See generally Richard Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (To American
Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200 (2018).
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gatekeepers who provided a baseline set of facts that helped
shape national discussions.7 Hasen rightly argues that low-cost
speech coupled with the waning power of traditional gatekeepers
has undermined “stabilizing institutions of American democracy
including newspapers and political parties.”8 The transition from
carefully curated and contextualized media content to a “media
firehose . . . has diluted trusted sources of information and led to
the rise of ‘fake news.’”9
Critically, however, socio-cultural factors that also drive
the production and efficacy of fake news are noticeably sidelined
in this analysis. Fake news is not only a product of technical
innovations that have transformed the public sphere, but also the
result of a particular cultural moment. While technology has
contributed to a general loss of faith in core democratic
institutions, it is not alone in shaping our cultural attitudes that
have led to widespread distrust and laid the groundwork for the
rapid spread of fake news.10
In this Essay, we argue that fake news is the product of a
unique socio-technical assemblage. In doing so, we demonstrate
how technology combines with a set of cultural factors, which
together create the conditions for the proliferation and
effectiveness of fake news. This Essay proceeds in several further
parts. Part I makes the case for incorporating cultural factors into
the analysis of fake news by arguing that analyses that focus
exclusively on technical changes are incomplete. Part II
introduces a set of neglected cultural factors that—in concert
with technical innovations—give rise to fake news. Part III
shows how recent technical innovations and cultural attitudes
create a feedback loop that drives fake news and other potential
harms to democracy.
I. THE CASE FOR CULTURAL ANALYSIS
Technical explanations for fake news and its attendant
social harms are incomplete. This Part offers two main reasons
to examine cultural explanations for the fake news phenomenon.
First, digital platforms have displaced traditional news
gatekeepers on a global scale. Yet, the proliferation of fake news
is particularly acute in the United States.11 To some extent, fake
7

Id.
Id. at 202.
9
Id.
10
Fake news, in turn, feeds back into a general distrust of institutions.
11
See, e.g., Andrew Rettman, Oxford Study Raises Alarm on 'Junk' News in France, EU
OBSERVER (Aug. 21, 2017, 9:17 AM), https://euobserver.com/elections/137636;
Scott Roxborough, How Europe is Fighting Back Against Fake News, HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER (Aug. 21, 2017, 6:30 AM),
8
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news is a uniquely American problem, suggesting that other
factors (not merely technical ones) principally influence the rise
and spread of fake news. Second, though Internet and social
media use is consistent across the political spectrum, the
American right-wing media ecosystem tends to be significantly
more polarized than the left.12 Again, this suggests that fake news
and media polarization do not flow inexorably from the rise of
Internet communication and social media platforms. Since the
underlying technology of social media is largely similar across
countries (even if the individual players differ from state to state),
one would expect fake news to be consistent across those
countries if the phenomenon is technologically determined.
Similarly, liberals, conservatives, and moderates in America all
use the same set of platforms, so one would expect fake news and
media polarization to be much the same across the U.S. political
spectrum.
A. Fake News Across the Globe
Fake news gained national attention immediately
following the United States presidential election in 2016. Many
commentators suggested that the spread of fake news in the run
up to the election turned the election in favor of now-President
Donald Trump.13 Recent empirical data shows that fake news
made up a large percentage of news consumption prior to the
election.14 For instance, Michigan voters consumed equal
amounts of professional news content and junk news on Twitter
in the days leading up to the election. 15 By contrast, in the run
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/how-europe-is-fighting-back-fake-news1030837.
12
See, e.g., Robert M. Faris et al., Partisanship, Propaganda, and Disinformation: Online
Media and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET &
SOC’Y 1, 49 (Aug. 2017),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33759251/201708_electionReport_0.pdf?sequence=9.
13
Hannah Jane Parkinson, Click And Elect: How Fake News Helped Donald Trump Win a
Real Election, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2016, 11:27 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/14/fake-news-donaldtrump-election-alt-right-social-media-tech-companies; see also Callum Borchers, This
is a Real News Story About Fake News Stories, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/07/this-is-a-realnews-story-about-fake-news-stories/?utm_term=.f3844ecb0e94
14
See, e.g., Rettman, supra note 11; Faris et al., supra note 12.
15
Samantha Bradshaw et al., Junk News and Bots During the French Presidential Election:
What Are French Voters Sharing Over Twitter?, COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
PROJECT 1, 1 (Apr. 22, 2017), http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/sites/89/2017/04/What-Are-French-Voters-Sharing-Over-Twitterv10.pdf (“In the days leading up the US election, we did a close of junk news
consumption among Michigan voters and found a 1:1 ratio between professional
news content and junk.”). Researchers use “junk news” to designate “content [that]
includes various forms of propaganda and ideologically extreme, hyper-partisan, or
conspiratorial political news and information.” Research Design FAQ,
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up to the French election, junk news made up only 25 percent of
news content shared on Twitter.16 Interestingly, the same study
that examined sharing habits of Michigan voters also confirmed
that German and French voters shared more high-quality news
and less “junk news” content than their American counterparts.17
Another Oxford University report suggests several
reasons why fake news is a uniquely American phenomenon.18
First, very few people can accurately recall having seen fake
news19 except in the United States.20 Second, German and
French citizens often use the English term “fake news,” which
suggests that fake news is “something that has been largely
imported rather than a home-grown phenomenon.”21 Third, the
United States’ online news media ecosystem is more polarized
than in any country in Europe.22 The combination of these
factors makes the United States particularly amenable to fake
news and its attendant social harms.
In addition, fake news is largely spread on social media
platforms that monetize popularity rather than credibility.
Established, mainstream media institutions such as the Big Three
networks23 and newspapers including the New York Times and
COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA PROJECT, http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/about-theproject/research-design-faq/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). “Much of this content is
deliberately produced false reporting.” Id.
16
See Rettman, supra note 11.
17
Bradshaw et al., supra note 15; see also Mark Hosenball & Joseph Menn, Experts Say
Automated Accounts Sharing Fake News Ahead of French Election, REUTERS INST. (Apr.
20, 2017, 7:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-electionsocialmedia/experts-say-automated-accounts-sharing-fake-news-ahead-of-frenchelection-idUSKBN17M31G (noting that Philip Howard, the lead author of the study,
concluded that “[b]oth German and French voters are sharing smaller amounts of
junk news”).
18
See Philip N. Howard et al., Social Media, News and Political Information During the
US Election: Was Polarizing Content Concentrated in Swing States?, COMPUTATIONAL
PROPAGANDA PROJECT (Sept. 28, 2017), http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/sites/89/2017/09/Polarizing-Content-and-Swing-States.pdf;
Samantha Bradshaw & Philip N. Howard, Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global
Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation, COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
PROJECT (July 14, 2017), http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/sites/89/2017/07/Troops-Trolls-and-Troublemakers.pdf.
19
Researchers defined “fake news” as “news that is ‘invented’ to make money or
discredit others.” Nic Newman et al., Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017,
REUTERS INST. 1, 19,
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital%20News%20Re
port%202017%20web_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). Compare this with the
definition of “hoax” from Verstraete, Bambauer, & Bambauer, infra note 104 (“A
hoax is a news story with purposefully false content, is financially motivated, and is
intended by its author to deceive readers.”).
20
Newman et al. supra note 19, at 19.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 39.
23
The “Big Three” refer to ABC, CBS, and NBC. Douglas Blanks Hindman &
Kenneth Wiegand, The Big Three’s Prime-Time Decline: A Technological and Social
Context, 52 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 119, 119 (2008).
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Washington Post also depend upon popularity to an extent, since
both circulation and advertising are key to revenues, but that
popularity is significantly determined by these entities’
reputations for producing reliable content. Facebook and Twitter
are less overtly responsible for the information on their sites—
virtually all of their content is user-generated.24 We identify
Facebook posts and Tweets with individual users, not with the
platform that shares them. Thus, social media companies have
less to gain or lose from reputational consequences than they do
from maximizing viewership. This is not to suggest that these
firms are indifferent to false or misleading content; rather, it is to
make plain the point that their economic incentives align
differently than traditional media gatekeepers. Critically, then,
fake news is not a story about disintermediation.25 It is a story
about a changing of the guard among gatekeepers.
Polarized and sensational media contribute to
widespread distrust in the media establishment, and fake news
(and post-truth culture) leverages this distrust for its
effectiveness. Media polarization in Europe is limited by major
state-led media outlets that are trusted by citizens on both ends
of the political spectrum.26 As Simon Kuper notes, “state
broadcasters, [] the Ansa news agency in Italy, [and] Germany’s
centrist mass media” provide a source that is generally trusted
and, as a result, “few western Europeans inhabit ideological
‘filter bubbles.’”27 Like state broadcasters in other parts of
Europe, the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) in the United
Kingdom limits polarization by establishing a baseline set of
accepted facts for national debates.28
While trusted state media sources provide a bulwark
against fake news in Europe, similar American media outlets are
less effective in that role. Possible American analogs for state
news sources in Europe would be National Public Radio (NPR)
and Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). A 2011 Pew Project for
Excellence in Journalism Report established that NPR and PBS
“were more neutral towards President Obama in his first 100
days on the job in 2009 than were most news organizations,” yet
24

See, e.g., Megan O’Neill, How Much Do Facebook & YouTube Profit From User
Generated Content?, ADWEEK (July 1, 2011), http://www.adweek.com/digital/usergenerated-content-infographic/.
25
See, e.g., Robert Gellman, Disintermediation and the Internet, 13 GOV’T INFO. Q. 1
(1996).
26
See Anya Schiffrin, How Europe Fights Fake News, COLUM. J. REV. (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/watchdog/europe-fights-fake-news-facebook-twittergoogle.php; see also Simon Kuper, Why There Will Never Be A Trump In Today’s Europe,
FIN. TIMES (June 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/396f895c-5b87-11e7-b553e2df1b0c3220.
27
Schiffrin, supra note 26.
28
Id.
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whether someone considers NPR and PBS trustworthy skews
heavily along partisan lines.29 Thus, American political
polarization has spread to the media ecosystem, undercutting the
ability of non-aligned news sources to act as honest brokers.
B. Media Polarization Across the U.S. Political Spectrum
Several commentators have suggested that social media
and personalized news feeds fuel media polarization and create
filter bubbles where people only see content that they already
agree with.30 Social media and personalized news dissemination
contribute to media polarization, but analyses that focus mainly
on the underlying technical architecture cut too broadly, for
several reasons.
People across the American political spectrum get
political information from social media at roughly similar rates,31
yet polarization is more extreme on the right.32 Yochai Benkler
and his co-authors succinctly make this point in a recent study:
“Our analysis challenges a simple narrative that the Internet as a
technology is what fragments discourse and polarizes opinions, by
allowing us to inhabit filter bubbles or just read ‘the daily me.’ If
technology were the most important driver towards a ‘post-truth’
world, we would expect to see symmetric patterns [of media
polarization] on the left and the right.”33 The authors further
conclude that, “[w]hile Facebook and Twitter certainly enabled
right-wing media to circumvent the gatekeeping power of
traditional media, the pattern was not symmetric.”34
Another study suggests the Internet and social media play
only a limited role in explaining the growth of polarization.35
Here, researchers found “that the groups least likely to use the
29

Alicia C. Shepherd, Views of NPR’s Credibility Tend To Be Partisan-Based, NPR (Apr.
28, 2011, 12:54 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ombudsman/2011/04/28/135775694/views-of-nprscredibility-tend-to-be-partisan-based.
30
CASS SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
(2017) (arguing that the Internet and social media have fueled political fragmentation
and polarization); see also ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: HOW THE NEW
PERSONALIZED WEB IS CHANGING WHAT WE READ AND HOW WE THINK (2012)
(same).
31
Aaron Smith, Cell Phones, Social Media and Campaigns 2014, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/03/cell-phones-social-mediaand-campaign-2014/ (“Participation in the digital campaign does not have a clear
partisan slant.”).
32
Yochai Benkler et al., Study: Breitbart-Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered
Broader Media Agenda, COLUM. J. REV. (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php; see also
Faris et al., supra note 12.
33
Benkler et al., supra note 32.
34
Id.
35
See Levi Boxell, Matthew Gentzkow, & Jesse M. Shapiro, Greater Internet Use is Not
Associated With Faster Growth in Political Polarization Among US Demographic Groups,
114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 10612, 10612 (2017).
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Internet experienced larger changes in polarization between
1996 and 2016 than the groups most likely to use the Internet.”36
If the Internet and social media were largely responsible for
driving polarization, groups who use these technologies more
often should see more rapid polarization than groups who use
them less frequently. Instead, researchers found the opposite
effect, suggesting that the recent trend toward polarization
cannot be wholly explained by reference to the underlying
technology. Thus, polarization is underdetermined by Internet
and/or social media usage.
C. The Internet and the Decline of Traditional Media
There is at least one structural effect of Internet
technology on traditional media that has been largely neglected
in the analysis of fake news. Scholars tend to view the online
advertising market as a zero-sum game: the revenues earned by
Facebook and Google come at the expense of potential
advertising by newspapers and television stations. Ergo, the rise
of digital platforms is a contributing factor, if not the principal
cause, of the decline of newspapers (and, to a lesser extent,
television stations).37 This argument is almost perfectly wrong.
As journalist Jack Shafer notes, newspapers have been in a state
of gradual decline since the early twentieth century.38 The most
potent challenge to newspaper ad revenues is not social media—
it’s the relatively low-tech Web site Craigslist.39 Classified ad
revenues were the life blood of most newspapers, particularly
local ones. Craigslist absorbed much of this revenue by making
classifieds cheap (or free) and easily searched.40 And the plunge
in newspaper classified ad revenues began in 2000, four years

36

Id.
See, e.g., Robert G. Kaiser, The Bad News About the News, BROOKINGS: THE
BROOKINGS ESSAY (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2014/bad-news.html#
(stating that “as newspaper revenues have plummeted, the ad revenue of Google has
leapt upward year after year—from $70 million in 2001 to an astonishing $50.6
billion in 2013”).
38
Jack Shafer, Don’t Blame Craigslist for the Decline of Newspapers, POLITICO:
MAGAZINE (Dec. 13, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/craigslist-newspapers-declineclassifieds-214525 (noting that “[n]ewspapers have been declining since the arrival of
radio in the 1920s, with a steady attrition of total titles and per capita consumption
over the years”).
39
See Robert Seamans & Feng Zhu, Responses to Entry in Multi-Sided Markets: The
Impact of Craigslist on Local Newspapers, 60 MGMT. SCI. 476, 490 (2014).
40
See Shafer, supra note 38; Seamans & Zhu, supra note 39; Philip Weiss, A Guy
Named Craig, N.Y. MAGAZINE,
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/media/internet/15500/ (last visited Feb. 22,
2018).
37
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before Facebook was founded and six years before Twitter was.41
(Craigslist launched in 1996.42) It is strange to hear
commentators complain that “Facebook and Google . . . exploit
the work of traditional providers of news that create information
useful to Facebook friends and Google searchers.”43 The
information is indeed useful, but as the same commentator notes,
the new digital intermediaries “lead large numbers of readers to
the journalism of the legacy media.”44 Most content providers are
delighted to have gatekeepers send traffic—and eyeballs—their
way; after all, that is how they sell advertising. Most of these
critiques fail to understand the economics of either newspapers
or social media, and cannot establish a causal relationship
between the rise of platforms and the decline of institutional
media.
The rise of digital intermediaries does not occur in a
cultural vacuum. At minimum, examining cultural factors that
lend support to fake news and “post-truth” society offers a new
point of reference to make sense of our time. The next section
examines a set of neglected cultural factors that—together with
the technical structure of the digital media ecosystem—construct
the fake news phenomenon.
II. FAKE NEWS AND OUR UNPREDICTABLE FUTURE
Upon reflection, it should be no surprise that fake news
and post-truth politics are emerging at this particular cultural
moment. These phenomena rely on a general sense of
uncertainty about the future—something that the present
situation provides in abundance.45 At the highest level of
abstraction, fake news and post-truth society—and their
newfound effectiveness—are largely determined by the loss of
faith in a stable future, driven in part by the 2008 financial crisis
and climate change. More specifically, our financial and

41

See Sydney Jones, Online Classifieds, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 22, 2009),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2009/05/22/online-classifieds/; Mark J. Perry,
Creative Destruction: Newspaper Ad Revenue Continued its Precipitous Free Fall in 2014, and
it’s Likely to Continue, AEIDEAS (Apr. 30, 2015, 11:24 AM),
https://www.aei.org/publication/creative-destruction-newspaper-ad-revenuecontinued-its-precipitous-free-fall-in-2014-and-its-likely-to-continue/; Jay Yarow,
Why The Newspaper Industry Collapsed, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2011, 4:02 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-newspapers-classified-adsrevenue-2011-3.
42
Jones, supra note 41.
43
Kaiser, supra note 37.
44
Id.
45
See, e.g., Stuart Jeffries, Welcome to the New Age of Uncertainty, THE GUARDIAN (July
26, 2016, 12:51 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/new-ageof-uncertainty-brexit-trump-future-world-flux.
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ecological crises46 have cleared the ground for widespread
distrust of experts and the surge of populist sentiment in the
United States and abroad. Fake news and the larger
phenomenon of post-truth culture have been built on this
framework.
The rise of fake news is both a symptom and an effect of
a widespread decline in America’s public trust in institutions and
experts.47 Since the Watergate era, people have lost faith—
sometimes overwhelmingly—in nearly every major American
institution.48 For the purposes of this Essay, the two most
important entities that have suffered a loss in prestige are
government (particularly the federal government) and major
media institutions, such as the three principal broadcast
television networks and national newspapers.49 These two
institutions were arguably the country’s most important
newsmakers: the government, by formulating and implementing
policy; and the media, by curating and transmitting information
about those policies. The two frequently formed an odd and
uncomfortable partnership. When Walter Cronkite, previously a
supporter of the Vietnam War, issued a critical three-minute
statement on the nightly CBS News broadcast in February 1968
in the wake of the Tet offensive, it was widely perceived as a key
turning point in American perceptions.50 The government
generated events (and the concomitant information), but it was
principally the purview of the media to determine what
constituted “news.”51
46

In many ways, this separation between financial and ecological crisis is artificial.
For instance, climate change is exacerbated capitalism and the prioritization of
profit, rather than sustainability. Benjamin Y. Fong, The Climate Crisis? It’s Capitalism,
Stupid, N.Y. TIMES (November 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/opinion/climate-capitalism-crisis.html.
47
See Ethan Zuckerman, Mistrust, Efficacy and the New Civics: Understanding the Deep
Roots of the Crisis of Faith in Journalism, ASPEN INST. 1, 4 (July 2017),
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2017/07/zuckerman.whitepaper.
FINAL_.pdf.
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See, e.g., Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP,
http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx (last visited Feb. 22,
2018); Bill Bishop, Americans Have Lost Faith in Institutions. That’s Not Because of Trump
or ‘Fake News’, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/03/americanshave-lost-faith-in-institutions-thats-not-because-of-trump-or-fake-news/.
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See Confidence in Institutions, supra note 48 (revealing that the major exception to
this trend of distrust is the military).
50
See Final Words: Cronkite’s Vietnam Commentary, NPR (July 18, 2009, 4:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106775685.
51
Information, however, did not necessarily have to be verifiably true to be deemed
news. See Christopher Woolf, Back in the 1890s, Fake News Helped start a War, PRI
(Dec. 8, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-12-08/long-and-tawdryhistory-yellow-journalism-america (noting that the Hearst newspaper chain reported
the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in 1898 as the fault of Spain, helping to start a war);
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Presidential Bid, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 17, 2008, 5:00 PM),
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The crux of the problem, then, was not that false
information was difficult to come by or unpopular. Fake news
has a long and seedy history in American politics and culture.
Benjamin Franklin invented lies about murders by Native
Americans purportedly working with the British during the
Revolutionary War.52 In 1835, the New York Sun, anxious to
increase circulation, published a series of stories claiming that a
new telescope had revealed inhabitants on the moon.53 When a
competitor revealed the fiction, the Sun nonetheless maintained
its newfound popularity.54 The Hearst chain of newspapers
spread lies about conditions in Cuba to sell copies, including the
assertion that Spain was responsible for the sinking of the
American battleship U.S.S. Maine.55 When the Federal
Communications Commission shut down Dr. John Brinkley’s
broadcasts advertising a fraudulent male impotence cure in 1930,
he set up a radio station just across the border in Mexico— and
continued to have America’s most popular radio show.56 Alex
Jones ranted on a small Austin radio station for four years before
transitioning completely to his InfoWars Web site.57 Timothy
McVeigh read the hate novel The Turner Diaries in print before
deciding to launch a terrorist attack in Oklahoma City in 1995;
half a million other readers also purchased the book in paper
form.58 The National Enquirer has trafficked in Elvis sightings and
alien babies for decades, averaging five- to six-million copies sold
per year in the 1970s and 1980s.59 Few, however, believed that
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2008/01/17/72-front-runners-tears-hurt
(noting that the media reported that a Democratic presidential candidate cried during
a speech in New Hampshire, which captured the headlines and was ultimately fatal
to his campaign).
52
See Jacob Soll, The Long and Brutal History of Fake News, POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-violent214535.
53
See id.
54
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REV. 33, 35 (2007).
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See Andrew Lapin, The Bizarre History of a Bogus Doctor Who Prescribed Goat Gonads,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 15, 2016),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/07/documentary-interview-medicinescience/; see also Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest”
Standard: The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 613 (1998).
57
Alexander Zaitchik, Meet Alex Jones, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 2, 2011),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/talk-radios-alex-jones-the-mostparanoid-man-in-america-20110302.
58
See Julie Salamon, The Web As Home for Racism and Hate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23,
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/23/arts/television-review-the-web-ashome-for-racism-and-hate.html; see also Jo Thomas, Behind a Book That Inspired
McVeigh, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/09/us/behind-a-book-that-inspiredmcveigh.html.
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Senator Ted Kennedy had fathered an illegitimate child, or that
Bigfoot had been spotted. The Enquirer was simply not treated as
a reputable source, even though the paper did occasionally break
stories, such as infidelity by then-Presidential candidate Senator
Gary Hart in 1988, or a photo showing that accused murderer
O.J. Simpson did in fact own a pair of Bruno Magli shoes,
contradicting his testimony under oath.60 News did not qualify
as such until and unless one of the major media gatekeepers
deemed it such.
Distrust of the media is compounded by an ironic
mismatch between the set of journalistic norms and practices that
enabled major media entities to earn their reputations for
legitimacy, and the current information ecosystem of distrust.
Journalism is, in the first instance, self-policing: reporters,
editors, and ombudspersons are expected to verify stories and to
investigate inaccuracies, even after publication.61 Thus, the New
York Times and Washington Post both launched major efforts to
ascertain why they published as fact claims by the administration
of President George W. Bush that Iraq possessed weapons of
mass destruction.62 After external pressure and an internal
investigation, CBS News admitted that it was duped into
reporting on documents that purported to show that President
Bush had failed to complete his service in the Air National
Guard.63 And The New Republic was forced to retract a series of
stories written by then-prodigy Stephen Glass that were entirely
fiction.64 For mainline media, self-assessment and disclosure of
mistakes are core components of professional normative
commitments.
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/08/business/national-enquirer-cuts-backsensationalism-but-still-haunted-its-past.html (“The Enquirer, the market leader in
dishing dirt on celebrities, has seen its circulation tumble nearly 55 percent from a
peak of 6 million a week in the late 1970's to 2.7 million today.”).
60
David Phillips, Printing the Truth Hasn’t Kept Readership From Fleeing the National
Enquirer, CBSNEWS.COM (May 10, 2010),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/printing-the-truth-hasnt-kept-readership-fromfleeing-the-national-enquirer/.
61
See, e.g., SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PROF’L JOURNALISTS,
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last revised Sept. 6, 2014) (calling on
journalists to “Acknowledge mistakes and correct them promptly and prominently.
Explain corrections and clarifications carefully and clearly.”).
62
See Franklin Foer, The Source of the Trouble, N.Y. MAG.,
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/media/features/9226/; see also Gary Younge,
Washington Post Apologises for Underplaying WMD Skepticism, THE GUARDIAN (Aug.
12, 2004, 9:28 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/aug/13/pressandpublishing.usa.
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See Jarrett Murphy, CBS Ousts 4 For Bush Guard Story, CBS NEWS (Jan. 10, 2005,
6:48 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-ousts-4-for-bush-guard-story-10-012005/.
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https://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/1998/09/bissinger199809.

142

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

Increasingly, though, admissions of error are treated as
admissions of guilt by media consumers. For example, when
CNN decided to retract a story about ties between the
administration of President Donald Trump and Russia, the
choice to pull the piece tarnished the network’s reputation rather
than bolstering it.65 Significant errors by large mainline media
entities remain relatively rare. However, each one provides a
telling example of salience bias for many consumers.66 Errors
that are disclosed by media outlets themselves demonstrate
incompetence, while those that are caught by outsiders prove
malfeasance. While this approach resonates across the American
political spectrum,67 it is dominant among political
conservatives, for whom innate suspicion of the “lamestream
media” is an article of established faith.68 This generates effects
even more pernicious than bipartisan attacks on the media, who
are increasingly seen not as muckrakers, but as politically
motivated operatives. The journalistic imperative to question
governmental action is thus seen not as useful skepticism, but as
thinly disguised bias.
Loss of trust in established media sources is just one
aspect of a more generalized sense of distrust of traditional
institutions. Earlier this year, The Atlantic examined the origins
of widespread loss of faith in institutions and how this change
powers the populist surge in American politics.69 Uri
Friedman—writing for The Atlantic—highlighted a multi-year
study70 by Edelman (a global communications firm) tracking
citizens’ faith in four key institutions: government, business,
NGOs, and media. He noted that “[t]he report theorized that
trust levels began declining as a result of the 2008 financial crisis
65
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692-94 (2006); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 24–26, 33–34
(2008).
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and have continued to suffer as globalization and new
technologies increase people’s concern about their job security
and future economic and social status.”71 Here, too, attacks on
expertise have been launched from both sides of the political
aisle. Critics on the American political left believe that experts
are covering up the harmful effects of vaccines72 or genetically
modified foods,73 despite the utter absence of reliable scientific
data to support such claims.74 (Indeed, the principal study cited
in support for the claim that vaccines cause autism was revealed
to have been invented by its author.)75 Critics on the right doubt
that the planet is warming,76 or that human actions play an
important role in climate change,77 or reject evolution in favor of
creationism.78 The scientific method is respected only when its
results conform to critics’ prior commitments, rational or not.
Accompanying the loss of faith in experts is a distrust of
their tools (data and statistics). Will Davies points to this loss of
faith in statistics as a defining feature of fake news. Davies
suggests that “[t]he declining authority of statistics and the
experts who analyze them—is at the heart of the crisis that has
become known as ‘post-truth.’”79 The distrust of statistics signals
increasing polarization and problems for democracy more
71
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Conspiracy Theory, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017),
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See, e.g., Jeffrey Smith, 10 Reasons to Avoid GMOs, INST. RESPONSIBLE TECH. (Aug.
25, 2011), http://responsibletechnology.org/10-reasons-to-avoid-gmos/.
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See, e.g., Genetically Engineered Crops: Experiences and Prospects, NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
(2016), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23395/genetically-engineered-cropsexperiences-and-prospects; Stanley Plotkin, Jeffrey S. Gerber, & Paul A. Offit,
Vaccines and Autism: A Tale of Shifting Hypotheses, 48 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES
456, 460 (2009).
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generally. Trust in data and statistics is a precondition to being
able to resolve disputes about the world—they allow participants
in policy debates to operate at least from a shared reality. Instead
of resolving competing claims about the world, “statistics may
actually be stoking them.”80 Merely introducing empirical
evidence can alienate people who have come to view statistics as
elitist.
While total loss of faith in statistics may be unwarranted,
the pall of uncertainty that surrounds our future has cast doubt
on the legitimacy of some forms of reasoning (and their capacity
to predict “true” facts about the world) and the experts who
deploy them. Philosophers—since the Pyrrhonian skeptics of
Ancient Greece—have questioned inductive reasoning’s ability
to predict true facts about the world. David Hume famously
critiqued inductive reasoning by claiming that induction relies on
a “principle of uniformity of nature” which assumes that laws
and processes governing nature have operated and will continue
to operate in the same way. Because the uniformity of nature
cannot be proven without reference to induction, inductive
reasoning itself is suspect. The uncertain future created by
financial crisis and climate change has undermined the
predictive power of models that rely on historical data and
assumptions about features of the world that once had the force
of law. Our current crises have upended these fundamental
assumptions leading us to wonder if the principle of uniformity
still holds (and whether induction is still valid)
This idea is not entirely new—at least for climate change.
Academics in both the humanities and sciences have suggested
that we are living in an entirely new ecological epoch called the
Anthropocene.81 “Dipesh Chakrabarty, a theory-minded
historian at the University of Chicago, proposes that the
Anthropocene throws into question all received accounts of
human history, from Whiggish optimism to his own postcolonial postmodernism.”82 Whether or not we believe the
Anthropocene is a useful theoretical concept or rightly indicates
a radical break marking a new ecological era, our models have
been thrown into question. Consider, for example, how recent
super-storms like Sandy in 2012, or Hurricanes Harvey, Irma,
and Maria in 2017, were incredibly low-probability events that
nonetheless occurred. A Washington Post article examines this
link:
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In the case of Superstorm Sandy in 2012, the
storm’s particular path—a beeline toward New
Jersey, rather than out to sea—was abnormal.
Atlantic hurricanes often “recurve” and flow away
from the United States as they travel farther
northward. Sandy did the opposite.
In one analysis, NASA’s Timothy Hall and
Columbia University’s Adam Sobel found that
Sandy’s sharp turn toward New Jersey is expected
to happen only once every 714 years, based on the
history of Atlantic storms.
The result “implies either that the New York-New
Jersey area simply experienced a very rare event
(with climate change playing no significant role),
or that a climate-change influence increased the
probability of its occurrence,” they wrote in a 2013
study on Sandy’s angle of approach.83
A. Postmodernism and Pyrrhic Victories
The decline in respect for institutions and experts, and the
concomitant rise of fake news, represents in part a
counterrevolution against postmodernism. Simplifying greatly,
the postmodern trend in assessing scientific and empirical
methods, such as that exemplified by the sociology of scientific
knowledge movement, sought (largely successfully) to undercut
the traditional, positivist account of how we generate factual
information about the world.84 In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, science was seen as an unbiased method for
interrogating the natural world. Observation by ever-improving
instruments brought scientists continually closer—even if in
halting fashion—to truth. One example is Imre Lakatos’s work
on the philosophy of mathematics.85 For Lakatos, mathematics
advanced through a gradual progression of proof,
counterexample, and adjustment.86 While mathematical
theorems might never be complete, their history was one of everincreasing accuracy. On this standard account, scientific
83
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knowledge might be wrong or mistaken, but it always had a clear
referent: knowledge could be compared to the hard facts of the
universe.87 Issues such as culture or societal structure were
irrelevant to scientific pursuits.88
The sociology of scientific knowledge sought to debunk
this view of scientific practice, which it regarded as hopelessly
(perhaps even deliberately) naïve. As sociologist Steven Epstein
describes it, this work “revealed the cultural shaping of that
which came to be called scientific fact.”89 Bruno Latour and
Steve Woolgar, whose study of research at the Salk Institute for
Biological Studies is a classic in the field, rejected a firm
distinction between social and technical aspects of science,
treating the divide as something to explain rather than an
explanation.90 The larger goal was to drag scientific conclusions
off a positivistic pedestal and to subject them to the same
sociological and cultural analysis that other forms of knowledge
undergo.91 Latour and Woolgar set out a bold claim: “the very
act of perception is constituted by prevalent social forces.”92
David Bloor, one of the founders of the Strong Programme in the
discipline, took a correspondingly strong position: knowledge
“consists of those beliefs which men confidently hold to and live
by . . . [particularly] beliefs which are taken for granted or
institutionalised, or invested with authority by groups of men.”93
Scholars in this area sought to understand not only how scientists
arrived at judgments regarding competing claims to truth, but
also how they gained wider societal acceptance of those
judgments.94
The work of the sociology of scientific knowledge is easily
misunderstood as a sort of complete relativism. Some of its
adherents are not helpful on this score. For example, Paul
Feyerabend wrote that “a unified theory of the physical world
simply does not exist,”95 and famously defended witchcraft96.
87
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However, scientific knowledge is not arbitrary, even for
sociologists in this tradition. Rather, it is the culmination of a
process in which the distinctions between sound observation and
irrelevant error, between failed attempt and heroic advance, and
between valid and invalid arguments are governed not merely by
the data, but by science as a socially organized activity. What the
sociology of scientific knowledge and similar disciplines seek to
do is to focus attention on how the acceptance of certain
information as accurate for scientists depends upon a social
consensus in that community.
Postmodern critics have been surprised and then
displeased to see their approach co-opted for causes of which
they do not approve, such as climate change skepticism.97 If
knowledge is socially constructed, then climate scientists need
not have the last word on whether the planet is warming, and
indeed the data and theory used to show climate change can be
attacked as biased.98 Inconvenient facts do not have to be
explained away; instead, they can be ignored or simply
controverted. This approach can be employed as a stalling tactic,
to undercut a scientific consensus, or as a counterattack, by
constructing alternative claims and data.99 Both sides of
America’s political spectrum bear responsibility for nourishing
the postmodern challenge to empiricism, though it has become
established much more firmly among political conservatives.100
This assault on the construction of data about the world
inherently undercuts gatekeepers: there is no longer hegemony
for experts—or indeed anyone—about what constitutes a fact.
III. A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON INTERVENTIONS
Everybody complains about the weather, but nobody does
anything about it.
– Charles Dudley Warner
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Sometimes things should be left undone. This Essay seeks
to prove that the problem of fake news is far more complex than
typically portrayed; it is grounded in long-term political and
sociological changes in America rather than in very recent
technological or jurisprudential changes. Complex problems
typically lack simple answers, and fake news is no exception. The
last service this Essay hopes to provide is to throw some sand
into the gears of reform, because fast or straightforward fixes will
likely make matters worse.
A. Platform Problems
Changing social media platforms—via legal mandates,
alterations to code, or both—cannot solve larger issues around
distrust of gatekeepers and experts. But even if it could, critics of
Facebook and Twitter and other currently popular platforms are
long on rhetoric and short on practical advice. First, they rarely
offer a principled approach to defining “fake news,” other than
that it is whatever runs counter to their own beliefs. Evaluating
the problem as “fake news for thee but not for me” does not help
much; there is too much data uploaded to Facebook and its ilk
for human referees to evaluate more than a miniscule fraction of
it, and individual judgments are hard to reduce to a set of
algorithmic rules.101 My views on the risk of brain cancer from
cellular phones are grounded in science, whereas yours about the
uncertainty of anthropogenic climate change are bunk.102
Everyone from President Trump to Denver Broncos general
manager John Elway has their own opinion of what constitutes
fake news, and that makes it impossible for platforms to craft a
fix that will satisfy all comers.103
Second, even if one can elucidate a workably concise
definition of fake news, it is not clear how platforms can
practically implement changes to how they handle
101
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information—or, indeed, what those changes ought to be. As we
argue elsewhere, the rubric “fake news” covers a number of
species of false information.104 To separate satirical The Onion
articles from political hoaxes by Macedonian teenagers, one
must assess inchoate, subjective concepts such as intent and
motivation.105 Software code is poor at this type of subjective
analysis; indeed, there is a cottage industry that revolves around
criticizing algorithms along precisely these lines.106 Platforms
that try to purge fake news will inevitably generate both false
positive and false negative results, which will irritate users and
empower critics. Removing erroneous stories can disempower
users, particularly ones from marginalized communities.107
Adding context, such as by tagging stories as fake news, may not
affect new readers and may reinforce existing beliefs of
adherents. Either course risks the loss of viewers and
concomitant advertising revenues—an unattractive option for
publicly-traded companies with shareholders to satisfy. Thus, it
is not clear how companies ought to evaluate new information
programmatically, nor how they should handle data deemed
unreliable.
B. First Amendment Fears
Many critics argue that if diplomacy does not work to
force platforms and others to fix fake news, government ought to
be allowed to have recourse to the whip hand of legal regulation
to force them to do so.108 The obvious barrier is the First
Amendment and its attendant statutes that protect expression
against governmental intervention. While scholars still joust over
whether search engines and social media sites should enjoy free
speech protection, the reality is that the current Supreme Court
is, and will likely continue to be, highly skeptical of regulation of
expression. And, online publishers are immune from most civil
and state criminal liability for content created by others based on
104
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federal telecommunications law.109 While the political right is
beginning to warm to the idea of regulating Internet
intermediaries, creating the potential for an alliance of
convenience with critics from the left, legislative changes that put
platforms at greater risk of liability still face a difficult path.110
The solution for some critics, such as Richard Hasen (in
this volume), is to reconfigure First Amendment jurisprudence.
Hasen is suitably cautious about advancing the particulars of this
renovation,111 but we are skeptical about such tinkering, for a
number of reasons. The first is that speech regulation has an ugly
history; it tends to be deployed to suppress minority and
marginalized communities, rather than to defend them against
abuses.112 It is a dangerous weapon to deploy; today’s pressing
necessity may seem far less urgent in retrospect, and
governments may take advantage of those seeming needs to
forcibly quiet critics.113 Second, the anti-subordination approach
to the First Amendment rests upon a number of assumptions that
are practically and logically questionable.114 It posits that
political actors (the legislature and the executive) will act to
reduce the speech of politically powerful groups and to increase
the speech of marginalized ones. The risk, then, comes from a
109
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judiciary that could invalidate these speech regulations based on
First Amendment doctrine—even though the judiciary is
generally viewed as a countermajoritarian check.115 This
prediction is bizarrely anti-majoritarian: it posits that majority
political groups will intentionally work to benefit minority
ones—a prediction that runs counter to logic and experience.
Anti-subordination concentrates on the wrong actors and
reaches the wrong conclusions. It holds that if judges, especially
federal judges, would only see the light, then desirable
information regimes become possible. This at once proves too
much and too little: too much, because it assumes that
admittedly marginalized groups will have success in achieving
legislation that advances their interests (which seems particularly
implausible for progressives at present in light of the structural
disadvantages they face in national politics); and too little,
because if these groups can influence the political process, then
presumably that process will produce like-minded judges in time,
so the need for anti-subordination evaporates. Moreover, even
strict scrutiny analysis allows sufficiently well-justified and welltailored speech rules to survive; anti-subordination goals might
prove to be a compelling interest that warrants governmental
intervention.116 And, this approach has to assume that judges can
and do see through unwarranted attempts to claim the mantle of
a subordinated group. Political conservatives have begun to do
exactly this—in Silicon Valley, in Washington D.C., and
elsewhere.117 Climate change skeptics are a minority, but hardly
a subordinated one. If any of these assumptions founder, the
anti-subordination approach runs the risk of generating results
that undercut its goals.
Finally, widening the ambit of governmental regulation
of information could generate adverse consequences
internationally. American rules that restrict speech reduce the
country’s ability to combat censorship by other nations, even
115
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when other states’ efforts are far more heavy-handed and wideranging.118 Efforts to coordinate an international cybersecurity
regime have foundered in part on Russia’s insistence that such a
compact address “information war,” which that country defines
to include threats from unwanted political messages.119
***
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